Previously, we developed a type system to ensure secure information flow in a sequential, imperative programming language [vSI96]. Program variables are class%ed as either high or low security; intuitively, we wish to prevent information from Bowing from high variables to low variables. Here, we extend the analysis to deal with a multithreaded language. We show that the previous type system is insufficient to ensure a desirable security property called noninterference.
Introduction
The success of mobile code technologies depends in large part on what kinds of security guarantees can be made for clients executing the code. Among the concerns here is ensuring that code respects a client's privacy, so that sensitive information is not improperly disclosed. Current software approaches to security address the issue of protecting privacy by introducing protection domains and access privileges. The basic idea is to specify, via a security policy, a set of privileges for a piece of code based on its digital signature. A check is then made for a certain access privilege when the code attempts to cross a domain boundary, say for example if it attempts to access the local file system. If the privilege has been granted, execution proceeds. Keep in mind that the decision is made here against a security policy for the code's signature, not the code itself. This is the approach taken in the security architecture of the Java Developer's Kit (JDK) 1.2 [GMPS97] and in the extended stack introspection proposal of mDF97].
But suppose we can prove that a program'satisfies a secure information flow property that guarantees that the program respects private information. Then there is no need to check at runtime whether the code has permission to read private information; we can simply trust it, since the property guarantees that the information will not be improperly disclosed. This is the approach taken in this paper. We are interested in developing a type system for a concurrent programming language and exploring the secure-flow properties that can be shown to hold for all well-typed programs. With such a type system, code can be type checked for secur&low violations just once. Code that type checks can be allowed to run and eccess private information without any further checks.' Type checking might be done by a client's security architecture. Another way it might be done is at a code certification site. For example, efforts are underway at some companies in the U.S. to "certify" the security of Java compilation units used in electronic commerce servers. (It is understandable why consumer cor&dence is low here given the rash of stolen credit card numbers despite the use of encryption.) Such a site might apply a type checker es an initial step in certifying code. This paper continues our earlier work pSI96, VS97b, VS97a] on the relationship between typing, security properties, and semantics, but now in a concurrent setting. The paper presents the following results:
1. We show that the type system of pSI96] is no longer sufl%ent to guarantee a desirable security property, called noninterference, if we add threads to our language. The noninterference property is intended to assert that information cannot flow from high variables to low variables; basically, it says that the final values of Iow variables are independent of the initial values of high variables.
2. We show that the noninterference property can be restored in a multi-threaded language by requiring the gumls of while loops to have type low and by sequiring while loops themselves to-have type low cmd.
(Conditionals do not need to be restricted.) Thii is the main result of the paper.
3. Orudal to the above result, however, is the use of purely nondet ermini&ic thread scheduling. It is not 'We do not mean to suggest that such a type system would address al2 security concerns. Integrity properties, for instance. might well be best handled by code sigoing.
clear how such scheduling can be implemented in practice. We show that with more deterministic scheduling, such as round-robin time slicing [which is used in the implementation of Java threads in Windows NT 4.0), the noninterference property does not hold. We show that noninterference can be restored, regardks of the scheduling policy used, by also requiring the guards of conditionals to have type low. 4. We consider adding a clock to the language. We show that unless the clock is given type high, noninterference is not preserved.
The remainder of the paper is organized es follows. In Section 2, we give an example that shows that the type system of [VSI96j is insuflicient to ensure noninterference in a multi-threaded language. In Sections 3 and 4, we formally define the semantics of our multi-threaded language and its type system. Then, in Section 5, we prove that the type system guarantees the noninterference property. In Section 6, we explore how adding a clock to the language affects the noninterference property. In Section 7, we consider the consequences of using a Iess nondeterministic (but more implementable) semantics of concurrency. In Section 8, we discuss some interactions among the noninterference property and language semantics. Finally, in Section 9, we discuss some related work.
The EfFect of Threads on Noninterference
Recently, the authors showed that a Denning-style SBCUIPflow analysis of imperative programs can be formulated as a type system [VSISS] . For example, suppose that we wish to support two secnrity classes, L {low) and iY (high). Then we can use these security classes as the types of program variables. Thus, for variables x and y, we can say x : H to indicate that x holds high-security information and 0 : L to indicate that y holds low-security information. And then an improper assignment like y := 2 can be caught as a type error. Note, however, that the opposite assignment x := y should be allowed; to deal with this we introduce stibtyping into our type system and say that L C H. More subtly, the type system must also guard against Implicit information flows, as seen in a program like if even(z) then y := 0 else y := 1, which indirectly copies the last bit of z into y. To deal with such implicit flows, the type system also cIassi&s program commands ss having either type H cmd or L cmd; intuitively, a command of type H cmd cannot transmit any information to L variables and hence can safely be used in the branches of a conditional whose guard has type X.
In [VSI96] , it is shown that the type system ensures that every well-typed program c satisfies a noninterference property, which can be described as follows: suppose that ,o and Y are two memories that agree on all L variables and that c can be run successfully starting from both p and v, yielding final memories $ and v'. Then $ and v' aIso agree on all L variables. Intuitively, this means that information cannot "leak" from H variables to L variables, since the final values of L variables are independent of the initial values of H variables2 Furthermore, programs can be &e&ed automatically for type correctness, by doing type inference pS97b]. However, the language considered in [VSISS] is sequontial, while mobile programs (such as Java applets) are often multi-threaded. For this reason, it is important to extend our analysis to deal with a multi-threaded language and to see how the noninterference property is affected by the presence of concurrency. This is the main goal of this paper.
We begin with an example that shows that the type system of pSI96] is no longer sufficient to ensure noninterfcrence if we extend our language with concurrent threads that communicate via a shared memory. The program, which consists of three threads, is given in Figure 1 But, if the program is run in a memory where initially maintrigger = 0,triggerO = &trigger1 =&result = 0, mask is a power a 2, and PIN is an arbitrary natural number less twice mask, then, assuming that scheduling is fair [i.e. each thread is scheduled infinitely often), the program eventually halts with the value of PIN copied into result, Thus the noninterference property is violated.
To restore the noninterference property in this concurrent setting, we impose two new restrictions on the typing of while loops: we require that the guard of a while loop have type L, and we require the while loop itself to get typo L mid. The new restrictions succeed in ruling out the above program-since trigger0 end trigger1 have type H, they cannot be used in the guards of the while loops in threads aandp.
In' the next three sections, we develop these ideas precisely, proving that the new restrictions on while ioops are sufficient to restore the noninterference property for multithreaded programs.
Syntax and Semantics
Threads are written in the simple imperative language: if e then cl else c2 1 while e do c Metavsriable z ranges over identifiers and n over integer literak. Integers are the only values; we use 0 for f&a and nonzero for true. Note that expressions are all pure (i,e, they do not cause side effects) and total (i.e. they do not contain partial operations lie division).
The concurrent systems that we consider here consist simply of a set of commands (the threads) that run concurrently; we do not consider facilities for creating new threads. Following the approach taken in Cliff Jones's nopX (Jon96), we model a system of threads with an o&~t map 0, which is simply a finite function from thread identifiers (a, p, . , , ) to commands. In addition, there is a single global memory cd, shared by all threads, that maps identifiers to integers.
[Note that in thii simple context, we don't need to distinguish identi&rs from locations.) The only way that threads can interact is via the shared memory.
In this paper, we assume for simplicity that expressions are evaluated atomically. Thus we simply extend a memory p in the obvious way to map expressions to integers, writing p(e) to denote'the value of expression e in memory p, Noto mask' := mask I 2; trigger0 := 1; trigger1 := 1 Figure 1 : A multi-threadedprogramthatleaks information that p(e) is always defined, .provided that every identifier occurring in e is in the domain of cc, which will always be the case if e is wetl typed.
As in Gum% [Gun92], we define the semantics of commands via transitions. (while e do c,p)-f-)(c; while e do c,p)
These rules define a transition relation & on configuretions. A configuration is either a pair (c,~) or simply a memory p. In the first case, c is the command yet to be executed; in the second case, the command has terminated, yielding final memory p. We write ak for the k-fold self composition of 4, and A* for the reflexive, transitive closure of 4.
Next we have two rules specifying the global transitions that can be made by a system of threads:
The semantics, at the global level, is thus purely nondeterministic. {At thii point, we don't even require that scheduling be fair.) How to implement this semantics is an open question; this will be discussed further in Sections 7 and 8.
The Type System
Here are the types used by our type system:
(data types) 7 ::= L 1 H (phrase types) p ::= r 1 T VUP 1 r cmd For simplicity, we limit the security classes here to just L and H; it is possible to generalise to an arbitrary partial order of security classes.
Our type system, whose rules are given in Figure 2 , allows us to prove tyrping judgments of the form 7 l-p : p as well as subtyping judgments of the form pr c pa, Here 7 denotes an identifier typing, which is a finite function from identifiers to phrase types.
If 7 l-c : p for some p, then we say that c is well typed under 7. Also, if O(o) is well typed under 7 for every cy E dam(O), then we say that 0 is well typed under 7.
As compared with the type system of [vS196], the typings of while loops are here restricted in two ways: first, the guard of a while loop must have type L, and second, the while Ioop itself can only get type L cmd.
Type Soundness
We begin with three lemmas that establish the key propcrties ensured by the type system; these lemmas are then used to prove that well-typed programs have the noninterference prwerty.
Lemma 5.1 (Simple Security) 1f 7 l-e : L, then every identifier in e has clcss L.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. 0 Lemma 5.2 {Confinement) If7 l-c : H cmd, then euenJ identij?eF assigned to in c has class H, and c is guaranteed to terminate successfel?y from any memory p where dom(,u) = do&+ Proof. By induction on the structure of c, and using the fact .that c cannot contain any while loops. fl Proof. By induction on the structure of c. If c is of the form cr;ce, then it follows that 7 C cl : r cmd and 7 I-ce : r cmd. {The argument for this is complicated somewhat by the presence of subtyping.) If tho transition is by the second rule (SEQUENCE), then by induction 7 I-c; : T cmd, and so by rule (COMPOSE) 7 I-c:;c2 : T cmd. If the transition is by the first rule (SEQUENCE), the argument is simpler.
If c is of the form while e do cl, then r must be L, and wemusthave7l-cr:Lcmd,andso7l-cl;whileedocl:
The case of if e then cl else c2 is similar. q
We also need a lemma about the execution of a sequential composition:
Proof. By induction on k. 0 Definition 5.1 Given an identifier typing 7, we say that memories p and u are equivalent, written ,u++u, if JL, U, and 7 haue the same domain and p and u agree on all L identijiers.
We also say that two commands are equivulent if this can be.shown from the foliowing three rules:
I. Xf c = c', then c-+'. Wby do we need a notion of equivalence on commands? Well, we are trying to show that executing a command twice, from two equivalent memories, leads to equivalent memories. But to prove thii property by induction on the number of transitions, it is necessary to deal with the fact that the two executions can proceed quite differently, because conditionals with H guards need not follow the same branches in the two executions. For this reason, we must prove a more general property: roughly speaking, equivalent configurations go to equivalent configurations.
Remark. The need for clause 3 in the above definition can be seen from the following example. (&,v) goes to II' in 50 steps. Then (cl; c2,~) goes in one step to {cs,~'). But (dl; ~2, V) takes 50 steps to get to (CZ, v'). And we need dl to run to completion in order to get the required program equivalence, since c2 is not equivalent to d;; c2 for any d;, under our definition of-r. End of Remark.
We now wish to apply the Sequential Noninterference Theorem to establish a Concurrent Noninterference Theorem. We begin with a lemma, which depends crucially on our nondeterministic scheduling, that shows that any execution of a thread can be "lifted" to an execution of the global system: The case where (c, p)--?-) k-l-1 p' is simiIar. El
Remark. Thii lemma remains true if we assume that s&eduIing is fair, since we are dealing only with finite computations here. But if we assume bounded fairness, SO Many languages include a system clock that can be read by a running program; for instance, Java includes a function system. currentTime!fillis 0. One would expect that such a clock would have implications for secure information flow, since it makes timiig information observable internally. Is this section, we explore this issue.
To include a clock, we use a special identifier t, initially 0, which tells the number of transition steps that have been made in the current program execution. We can mnkc 1 read-only by giving it either type L or H, rather than L ww or H var. We must modify the semantics of some commands to update t appropriately; the modified transitions are given iu Figure 3 . Now, if we assume t : L, then we clearly run into trouble with the noninterference property. For example, suppose that x : H, y : L, and c : H cmd is a command that takes 20 steps to finish. Consider the following program, which has just one thread: Assuming that z is either 0 or 1 initially, thii program copies z into y. By checking the value of t, the program can de termine whether c was executed or not, which in turn tells whether 2 = 1 or not. But if we assume, instead, that t : N, then the above program is ill-typed, because the branches of the second conditional do not have type H cmd. And, indeed, if t : H, then the proof of Theorem 5.5 still goes through, and so the noninterference property is preserved.
Other Scheduling Policies
The semantics of concurrency given by rule (GLOBAL) is purely nondeterministic; the rule simply says that at every step, any thread can be selected to run for a step. It is important to understand that the noninterference results of the last section depend crucially on this nondeterminkm. For example, Corollary 5.8 says that if IL-.+ and there is some way of scheduling the t&ads of (0, p) that leads to termination, then there is some way of scheduling the threads of (0, V) that leads to an equivalent result. But the two schedules can be very different! In particular, even if the first schedule treats all threads equally (in the sense that it gives each thread a roughly equal amount of CPU time), the second schedule might have to greatly favor one thread over the others. Therefore, if we impose additional constraints on the way scheduling is done, we may falsii the Global Execution Lemma and hence the noninterference property.4
For example, suppose that scheduling is done by roundrobin time slicing, with a time-slice of b steps. Let 2 : H and y : L and consider the following two threads: Another approach to scheduling is probabilistic. One might attempt to approximate the effect of rule (GLOBAL) by flipping coins at each step to select the next thread to run. While such an impkmentation is in some ways faithful to rule (GLOBAL), the adoption of a probabilistic semantics makes it possible to create probabilistic wuert channels [Gra90] , wbicb cannot be addressed without refining the notion of noninterference. Tbis point is discussed in more detail in Section 8.
To preserve noninterference in the face of an arbitrary scheduler, it appears necessary to require the guards of conditionals to have type L. If this is done, we can strengthen the Sequential Noninterference Theorem to the following form: This Lockstep Execution result is strong enough to establish Concurrent Notiterkrence, regardkss of how scheduling is done. Anything done under p can now be exactly mirrored under u. Also, Lockstep Execution implies that we can add a clock t and even give it type L, since program timing now cannot depend on the values of H variables. Unfortunately, restricting conditionals in thii way is liiely to be quite burdensome in practice.
On the other hand, it can be useful for guarding against timing attacks.
Kocher, for example, describes a timing y := rand (lO0) where rand(100) returns a random integer between 1 and 100. Now, thii program satisfies our noninterference propew: regardless of the value of x, the final value of y can be any integer between 1 and 100. But this program doesn't seem to be secure! If we were to run the program repeatedly, we would expect a sequence of final values for J something like and we would feel quite confident that (ii this case) the value of x is 22. How can this be explained? The answer is that we have implicitly changed the semantics of our language frdm the purely nondeterministic semantics of rule (GLOBAL) to some kind of probabilistic semantics. In a nondeterministic se mantics, outcomes are either possible or impossible, with no further distinction. But in a probabilistic semantics, outcomes occur according to some probability distibution, which makes it possible to make probabilistic inferences.
In our example, if we assume that each thread has an equal probability of being scheduled at each step and that rand(100) generates all numbers in the range 1 to 100 with equal probability, then we can see that the iinal value of y will be the'initial value of x with probability 101/200, and will be any other number between 1 and 100 with probability l/200. Hence we can be co&dent of correctly guessing the initial value of x by running the program repeatedly and picking the most common final .value of y. To rule out such probabilistic inferences, we would need a more refined notion of noninterference that requires that the probabWy dish-ib&on of the final value of y be independent of the initial value of I. The program would not satisfy such a probabiitic notion of noninterference, because changes to the initial value of x do change the distribution of the fmal value of y.
Thus we can see that the appropriate formulation of the noninterference property depends on the kind of language being considered. In all cases, the idea is that the final values of low variables are independent of the initial values of high variables. For a deterministic language, this means that changing the initial values of high variables cannot change the fmal values of low variables. For a nondeterministic Ianguage, as considered in this paper, it means that changing the initial values of high variables cannot change the aei of possible final values of low tiiables. And for a probabilistic language, it means that changing the initial values of high variabIes cannot change the distributdon of possible final values of low variables.5
It can, of course, be argued that a nondeterministic scmantics as used in thii paper is unrealistic, because any real implementation would display probabilistic behavior, It is perhaps worth remarking that a nondeterministic semantics can be regarded as an abstraction of a probabilistic semantics in which one equates "possible" with "occum with nonzero probabiIity". For instance, an implementation of rule (GLOBAL) that f3ips coins at each step to decide which thread to run has the property that each thread has a nonzero probability of being selected at each step. Indeed, any terminating execution possible under rule (QLOBAL) has a nonzero probability of occurring in the impIementation, Therefore, Corollary 5.8 does hold for this implementation. However, one has to be careful with this view of possibility, Though the corollary assures us that, under such an implementation, one can never be certain of the initial values of high variabIes based on observing the final values of low variables, it does not mean that one cannot guess the initial values with high probability.
It is also worth remarking that thread a in the example above is rejected by our type system. This suggests that well-typed prograins in our system; if given a probabilistic semantics, might perhaps satisfy some sort of probabilistic noninterference property. But it is easy to see that our type system would not rule out probabilistic timing channels. For example, suppose x is a high Able whose value is either 0 or 1, y is a low variable, and c is a high command that takes a long time to exetiute. Consider the following two threads: If thread scheduling works by flipping a coin at each step to decide which thread to run, then with high probability the two threads run at about the same rate. Hence, with high probability the value of x ends up being copied into y. mending our type system to deal with a probabilistic Ianguage remains an area for future study.
Finally, it is well known that in some cases noninterfcrence is too restictive. In particular, noninterference cannot accommodate information downgrading. For example, information is &ectiveiy downgraded when it is encrypted. The ?n the security literature, there have been many nonintcrforoncclike properties proposed. problem is that ciphertext is sensitive to changes in high cleat-text, yet we would often like to treat the ciphertext as low. Thii is a clear violation of noninterference WcLSO].
Related Work
Analyzing code for various security properties has a long history. Denning pen75, Den76, DD77] developed a form of propam certification for detecting secure flow violations in code. It was inspired by the work of Bell and LaPadula [BL73], Fenton [Fen73] , and Lampson (Lam73], amqng others. There is also the classic operating systems protection work of Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman who showed that the problem of determining whether a program, comprised of simple primitives for updating an access matrix, leaks an access right is undecidable [KRU76] . See also pDG+76] for an excellent discussion about solvability and complexity issues associated with for@ systems for reasoning about program security.
More recently, there is the work of He and Gligor [HG92] who describe ways to eliinate timing channels in the source code of trusted computing bases using an automated tool. Bangtre, Bryce, and Le M&ayer [BBLM94] attempt to treat secure information flow in a nondeterminiiic setting; they give a compil&me technique for detecting flow violations in sequential programs.
Other more recent efforts are more closely related to our work in that they too attempt to characterize some sort of security analysis as a formal system of types. Palsberg and 0rbrek [P095] have developed a system to manage trust in the lambda calculus. It is not clear what an appropriate notion of type soundness is for their trust system, given that explicit coercions between trusted and untrusted entities are available in the core calculus. Any suitable notion should speak to security in some way. Abadi [Aba97] has developed a system of typing rules for ensuring secrecy in cryptographic protocols. These protocols are expressed in an extension of the pi calculus called spi. Type soundness is that of testing equivalence between two terms PC and Pa', where u and u' are substitutions of values for variables and P is a well-typed spi term. In other words, no other spi term, called an observer, can distinguish Pa from Pa'. Heintze and Riecke p8] attempt to refine Denning's analysis using more detailed type structure. They also extend their type system for a concurrent language but do not treat type soundness in thii case. Finally, Myers and Liikov [ML971 describe a decentralized approach to downgrading information in a secure information flow setting, but its soundness also is not addressed. Some sort of formal justification for downgrading is needed.
Conclusion
It is clear that with just ordinary thread implementations, users can exploit seemingly innocuous features lie thread priorities and scheduling to easily build reliable covert channels. An off-the-shelf implementation of Java is more than enough here. Furthermore, the bandwidth of such channels is not an issue, for private keys and credit card numbers require little bandwidth. A truly secure programming language demands fundamental changes in language design and an understanding of the relationship between semantics and security.
